The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other Essays — Key Ideas to Explore

Veblen's Critical Diction

Veblen's vocabulary is a deliberate instrument of critique. He favors terms like 'animus,' 'postulates,' and 'metaphysical' to expose the unexamined beliefs underlying economic theories. When discussing Roscher, he notes that the economist's 'philosophical postulates were different from those of the economists whom he discredits, and that they were regarded by him as self-evident.' This observation reveals Veblen's method: he identifies tacit assumptions by naming them. His use of 'naïve' to describe Roscher's method is not casual—it signals a pattern of treating inherited frameworks as natural rather than constructed. Throughout the essays, Veblen's diction consistently draws attention to the gap between what economists claim to do and what they actually accomplish.

The Structure of Argument by Contrast

Veblen builds his arguments through sustained contrast. In the essay on Gustav Schmoller, he juxtaposes the historical school's professed method with its actual practice: 'The historical economists can scarcely be said at that time to have put their hand to the new engines which they professed to house in their workshop.' This structural move—comparing stated intentions to realized outcomes—recurs across the collection. Veblen also contrasts the 'speculative interest' of earlier economics with the unfulfilled promise of evolutionary science. By setting up these oppositions, he forces readers to see the inconsistencies within economic thought without resorting to direct polemic.

Voice and the Role of the Observer

Veblen's authorial voice is that of a detached observer who nonetheless makes pointed judgments. He writes of Roscher that 'he has also left a more considerable volume of results achieved by the professed use of his method,' the word 'professed' carrying a hint of skepticism. This ironic distance is maintained even when Veblen seems to praise: 'Roscher is more naïve and more specific.' The effect is to position the reader as a fellow analyst, invited to see through the surface of economic doctrine. Veblen rarely uses first-person pronouns, preferring impersonal constructions that lend an air of inevitability to his conclusions.

Recurring Concerns: Habits of Thought

A thread running through these essays is the examination of how intellectual habits persist across generations. Veblen traces the Hegelian metaphysics that 'had in Roscher's youth an unbroken vogue in reputable German circles' and shows how it shaped Roscher's economics without being acknowledged. This concern with unexamined tradition appears also in the title essay's opening claim about modern civilization's self-perception. Veblen's interest is not in debunking individual thinkers but in revealing the 'common-sense' postulates that constrain entire fields. The essays collectively argue that science itself is a cultural product, subject to the same inertial forces as other institutions.

Readers approaching this collection should attend to Veblen's method as much as his conclusions. His essays reward careful parsing of sentences where a single adjective—'naïve,' 'professed,' 'tacit'—carries the weight of his critique. The excerpts here offer only fragments, but they reveal a writer who treats economic theory as a specimen of cultural evolution, to be dissected with precision and irony.

Veblen’s dry irony, that precise unmasking of how institutions cling to old habits, always reminds me of the reverent earnestness in The Vitality of Mormonism: Brief Essays on Distinctive Doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints — Reading Notes. They share a patient gaze—one skeptical, one faithful—yet both whisper that human belief, be it economic or divine, is never quite as rational as we pretend.