The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 05 — Text and Context

The Armed Neutrality as a Diplomatic Lever

Adams closely tracks the emergence of the armed neutrality, a league of neutral powers asserting the principle of free ships making free goods. In his letter of April 17, 1780, he predicts its probable effects on England's critical situation. He notes the anti-English policy of Russia and the proceedings in Holland, where the States of Groningen propose convoys to protect commerce. Adams sees the armed neutrality not as an abstract doctrine but as a practical check on British naval dominance.

He reports debates in the House of Lords, where Lord Camden expresses astonishment at the doctrine of free ships and free goods, and Lord Shelburne remarks on England's critical state. Adams interprets these reactions as signs of British vulnerability. The correspondence shows him piecing together diplomatic signals from multiple capitals, treating each declaration and address as a move in a larger strategic game.

Naval Power as the Decisive Factor

Adams returns obsessively to the theme of naval superiority. In a lengthy analysis, he argues that without a clear and indisputable command of the seas, New York will never be taken. He describes the city as so situated and fortified, garrisoned with troops accustomed to war and embittered by cruel passions, that even an army twice as numerous as Washington's and Rochambeau's combined would fail while the English hold naval equality.

He dismisses European wonder at the inactivity of the American army, explaining that the British have sheltered in seaport towns under the guns of their men-of-war. Adams insists that an attack on New York without a fleet would sacrifice thousands of lives with no possibility of success. He contrasts this with the British retreat from Philadelphia, which he attributes to fear of a French naval attack, not American land strength.

Reading the Enemy's Strategy

Adams attempts to infer British intentions from their movements. He notes that the English, ever since the alliance with France, have been fearfully apprehensive of an attack on their coastal strongholds. This fear, he argues, kept them confined to New York garrison in the previous year. He speculates on the destination of the French forces under de Ternay and de Rochambeau—whether Canada, Nova Scotia, New York, Carolina, or Georgia—but expresses no hopes of anything decisive from their operations unless they achieve naval superiority.

He predicts that the loss of both Floridas and all the West India Islands will not induce England to make peace and acknowledge American independence. Adams' tone is cautious, avoiding overconfidence. He admits he does not know the destination of the French fleet, and his analysis is hedged with conditionals. The correspondence captures a diplomat trying to forecast events from incomplete information, a recurring challenge in wartime diplomacy.

The Structure of Adams' Dispatches

Adams' letters follow a consistent structure: a dateline from Paris, a salutation to the President of Congress, and then a dense block of analysis without paragraph breaks. He moves from one topic to the next with little transition, often enclosing other documents. The letters are dated closely—April 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 28—suggesting a rapid pace of events and Adams' effort to keep Congress informed.

His voice is direct and argumentative. He exposes the errors of a writer from England on peace terms, refuting claims about America violating its treaty with France. He uses the first person sparingly, preferring impersonal constructions like 'it is not the loss of both the Floridas... that will induce them to make peace.' The dispatches are less personal reflections than strategic briefings, shaped by the need to convey complex geopolitical assessments in a clear, persuasive manner.

Readers approaching this volume should attend to the interplay between Adams' diplomatic reports and his military assessments. The letters are not merely records of events but arguments about cause and effect, shaped by Adams' conviction that naval power determines the war's outcome. The volume rewards those who read across multiple dispatches to trace how Adams revises his judgments as new intelligence arrives. It is a document of a mind at work, not a finished history.

Leafing through Adams’s 1780 letters, I paused at his quiet frustration over Europe’s tangled neutrality—so many reasoned positions leading nowhere. It reminded me of an old, half-forgotten volume, Bygone Beliefs: Being a Series of Excursions in the Byways of Thought — Background and Themes, where clever systems also dissolved into wistful conjecture. Both felt like eavesdropping on earnest minds, their certainties so tender against time’s slow drift.